The Concept of Alienation and the Development of Marx’s Thought

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David McLellan and I have been close colleagues and friends ever since I came to work at the University of Kent in 1969, where he was already well-established and a well-known Marx scholar. We have worked together closely ever since. I have benefited in countless ways from this contact and collaboration. It is difficult for me to pick out a single topic on which to focus. However, one contribution of his which had an enormous impact on Marxist scholarship in the English-speaking world, and on me personally, is his insistence on the continuity between the early and the later work of Marx. More specifically, he has been an important advocate of the view that the influence of Hegel’s ideas, and particularly of the idea of alienation, persists throughout Marx’s work; and this has also been a central theme of my work on Marx.

Marx’s discussion of alienation is most prominent and explicit in his early writings, particularly in the *1844 Manuscripts (or Paris Manuscripts)*, where the influence of Hegel’s philosophy is most evident. The place of these writings in Marx’s work, and the relation of Marx to Hegel more generally, have long been controversial issues. Although Marx himself went out of his way to stress his allegiance to Hegel,¹ there was little recognition of this among his early followers. Lenin came to recognize the importance of knowledge of Hegel’s philosophy for understanding Marx’s thought through his study of Hegel during World War I,² but he was unusual among early Marxists: a mechanistic and economistic interpretation was more prevalent. In the Stalin period this was imposed as the orthodoxy. Hegelian Marxists (such as Lukács, Korsch, Gramsci, Deborin, Ilyenkov, etc.) were barely tolerated.

The *1844 Manuscripts* suffered a similar fate. These, and other writings by Marx of this period left unpublished at his death,³ did not see the light of day for many years. The *1844 Manuscripts* first appeared in Moscow in 1932.⁴ The Soviet authorities treated them with suspicion as juvenilia written at a time when Marx was still excessively under the spell of Hegel, and before he had developed his ‘mature’ economic theory and the historical materialist approach; and this was the position adopted by many other Marxists as well. Thus, for example, the *Manuscripts* and other early works were not translated into English by Communist Party publishers until 1959;⁵ they were not included in the standard English
language editions of Marx and Engels, *Selected Works* until well into the 1970s. In this period they were seldom referred to or discussed by writers on Marx’s philosophy.

However, things changed rapidly in the ‘thaw’ that followed Stalin’s death in 1953. Translations of the early works into English and other European languages began to appear. These works rapidly became the focus for criticism of the mechanistic and economistic form of Marxism that had been the communist orthodoxy. They were hailed by a variety of ‘humanist’ Marxists in Eastern and Western Europe and America and by many thinkers associated with the New Left, as evidence of a newly revealed humanist, ethical aspect of Marx’s thought that called into question the economistic and mechanical interpretation of Marxism that had been the Soviet and more general Marxist-Leninist view since the early 1930s. Some even went so far as to suggest that the early writings, particularly the *1844 Manuscripts*, are, as Fromm put it, the ‘most articulate expression’ of Marx’s overall philosophy and the essential key to a true understanding of his thought.

These claims were also strongly disputed. By far the most important criticisms of them came from Althusser and the structuralist sort of Marxism that he espoused. This led many to refocus their attention away from the Hegelian and ethical themes in Marx’s work and back onto its political, economic and historical ideas. However, in his zeal to expunge any traces of Hegelianism from Marxism, Althusser went to the opposite extreme and discounted altogether the significance for Marxism of the early works and of Hegel as well. Althusser argued that there was a radical ‘break’ – an ‘epistemological break’ – between the Hegelian, ethical ideas of Marx’s early work centred on the concept of alienation, and his mature ‘scientific’ and materialist theory. From this perspective the concept of alienation has no place in an account of Marxism, properly so-called.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the influence of Althusser was at its height, and many Marxists in this period rejected Marx’s early works from the canon of Marxism. They were dismissed for putting forward a young Hegelian (Feuerbachian) ethical, teleological perspective, and for being, philosophical, ‘humanist’ precursors to the true canon of ‘scientific’ Marxism as contained in his mature writings. ‘Humanism’ became a pejorative term.

Others, however, criticized this picture and defended Marx’s humanism and the Hegelian themes in his thought. McLellan was an important figure in this group, which also included Avineri, E P Thompson and others on the New Left. They argued that Marx’s early writings
had an important philosophical and ethical content and deserved serious philosophical
attention.

One of most striking and effective contributions to these arguments was McLellan’s
translation of extracts from Marx’s Grundrisse (1971), a work most of which had not
previously been available in English. McLellan’s edition preceded the appearance of the
first full English translation by a couple of years, and it gave a first glimpse to English-
speaking readers of how knowledge of the Grundrisse was about to transform ideas about
Marx and Marxism. McLellan’s edition has stood the test of time as an excellent translation
and a remarkably well chosen selection which includes many of the passages which have
subsequently become main focuses of discussion.

McLellan’s selection of passages from the Grundrisse had a definite purpose. It was designed
to demonstrate that Marx did not abandon Hegelian ideas in 1845, and that they remained a
major influence on his thought right into his later work. This is made clear in McLellan’s
Introduction. The Grundrisse, he maintained, demonstrates that, ‘Marx’s thought is best
viewed as a continuing meditation on central themes broached in 1844 … The continuity
between the Manuscripts and Grundrisse is evident.’ He went on to argue that, ‘One
point in particular emphasizes this continuity: the Grundrisse are as `Hegelian’ as the Paris
Manuscripts.’

The Grundrisse is the first draft of what was to become, a few years later, volume One of
Capital. In the final published version of Capital, Hegelian modes of expression, so
prominent in the Grundrisse, are often toned down or eliminated altogether. By the time
Capital was published in 1867 Hegel had come to be treated, as Marx puts it, as a `dead
dog’. What the manuscript of the Grundrisse shows beyond the shadow of a doubt,
however, is that Marx had not abandoned Hegelian ideas and modes of thought in 1845 but
that he continued with them at the time he was drafting Capital, i.e., right through into his
later work. In the Grundrisse, Hegelian modes of expression are used freely to express ideas
which in the published version of Capital, are expressed in ways that do not make explicit
their Hegelian form. In this way the Grundrisse is, at it were, the `missing link’ which
demonstrates the evolutionary continuity between Marx’s early work and his later work.

What is needed, McLellan maintained, is an understanding of Marx’s thought which
acknowledges both its changes and its continuity. This required a thorough rethinking of the
development of Marx’s thought as it had been portrayed by the contending schools at the
time. On the one hand, he maintained, it would force ‘those writers who have wished to minimize the influence of Hegel on Marx … to revise their ideas.’ No doubt he had Althusser and his followers in mind here. On the other hand, it also demonstrated that “those interpretations of Marx which take the Paris Manuscripts as his central work have seriously misplaced their emphasis.”

The controversy about the extent of Hegel’s influence on Marx was, and still is, predominantly focused on the concept of alienation. McLellan’s selection of passages from the *Grundrisse* focuses on this concept too, and it will also be my focus in what follows. McLellan particularly highlights Marx’s use of the term ‘alienation’ which, he notes, ‘occurs much more in *Capital* than some writers appear to think, and … is central to most of the more important passages of the *Grundrisse*.’ (23)

Much of the controversy about the influence of Hegel on Marx’s thought has likewise concentrated on the use of Hegelian terms in Marx’s work. However, this is a superficial way to comprehend Marx’s philosophy. His use of Hegelian forms of thought goes much deeper than his use of particular terms and phrases. Marx was constantly seeking to find satisfactory ways of expressing his ideas. This is particularly apparent in the various attempts to formulate the ideas that are given their final expression in *Capital* and its various revisions.

As already noted, ideas that are described in thoroughly Hegelian terms in *Grundrisse* reappear in *Capital*, expressed in quite different language drawn more from classical political economy. One must look beyond the mere words that Marx uses to grasp the deeper patterns of his thought.

My aim here is to support and extend the argument for the continuity of Marx’s thought by showing that, even where the Hegelian language of ‘alienation’ is not explicitly used by Marx in his later work, the concept is present, and that an understanding of it is indispensable for grasping the main themes of his philosophy.

I will argue that the idea of a sharp break in the development of Marx’s philosophy lead to a seriously distorted understanding of both his early and his later works. On the one hand, it is wrong to see the concept of alienation in the early works as purely ethical and ‘humanist’ in character. Marx’s purpose in the works of 1844 is not simply to pass moral judgement on capitalism. On the contrary, these works constitute the beginning of Marx’s attempt to understand and analyse the nature of capitalism in economic and social terms. In his later
work the language of alienation (and Hegelian language more generally) is for the most part discarded, but not the fundamental ideas first created and developed in 1844. These remain fundamental to his social and economic thought, and indispensable for understanding the underlying themes of his philosophy. In particular, as I shall show, the theme of alienation and its overcoming is embodied in the concepts of abstract labour and fetishism which have a prominent place in the first chapter of *Capital*.

**The Early Work**

Alienation is a pervasive feature of modern life. It is one of the few theoretical terms from Marxism that has found a place in ordinary language. There it usually denotes a vague feeling of malaise or meaninglessness. In Marx, however, it has a precise meaning derived from Hegel’s philosophy. It describes a situation in which our own activities or products take on a form that is independent of us and act against us. For Marx, moreover, alienation is not a merely subjective feeling or appearance, it is an objective social and historical condition.

The fullest and most familiar account by Marx of the phenomenon of alienation is in the section on alienated or estranged labour [*entfremdete Arbeit*] in the *1844 Manuscripts*. Indeed, so much attention has been devoted to this passage in the discussion of alienation that labour is sometimes taken to be the main or even the sole area where Marx uses the concept. This is not the case. Marx identifies alienation in many areas of life, including religion, politics, and social and economic relations. In his earliest work, religion is the central example, and it is an example to which he often returns. ‘Man makes religion, religion does not make man’, says Marx, and yet the gods that we have created appear to be independent beings, judging and often hostile.

From 1844 onwards, Marx’s work focuses increasingly on economics. The *1844 Manuscripts* (written when Marx was only 26) constitutes Marx’s first extended attempt to get to grips with the work of the classical political economists, Adam Smith, James Mill, J. B. Say, etc. This represents a decisive turn in his thought. McLellan emphasises the continuity with Marx’s later work when he describes the *Manuscripts* as ‘in effect the first of several drafts preceding *Capital* in 1867’.

In these *Manuscripts* he uses the concept of alienation to analyse the nature of capitalism. His notion of alienated labour is often taken to refer to a purely subjective condition, a lack of satisfaction in work. Marx, however, uses the concept to analyse the ways in which – in
capitalism – our own products take on an independent and hostile form. Marx distinguishes four aspects of alienated labour:

1) Alienation from the object of labour. In capitalism, the product of labour belongs not to the worker but to an other and is used to exploit the worker.

2) The worker is also alienated in relation to the activity of labour. Work is experienced as painful and unpleasant, as forced and not free; it becomes merely a means to the satisfaction of individual material needs, not a need and an end-in-itself.

In this respect the concept of alienation does have moral implications which challenge the theory of human nature implicit in much economics. For the view that it is universal human nature to experience labour as intrinsically unsatisfying and undertaken only as a means to satisfy individual material needs, is fundamental to mainstream economics. It thus takes alienation to be necessary and unavoidable. Moreover, this is indeed how work is often experienced in fact. Marx challenges this view. Implicit in the concept of alienation is the idea that labour need not have this character. We are not the mere passive consumers we are portrayed to be in economic theory – we are essentially active and productive beings.

Alienation is not the result of an unchanging human nature, it is a social and historical condition. Work can potentially be a self-realising activity, alienation can be overcome.

3) These ideas are embodied by Marx in the notion of alienation from our ‘species being’ (Gattungswesen), our distinctively human being. Work is our ‘species activity’, the activity which distinguishes humans from other species. Other animals are driven by their individual appetites and instincts. For the most part, they satisfy their material needs immediately, by directly consuming what is immediately present to them. Humans, by contrast, are social beings who work to transform what is immediately present to satisfy their needs. Work is thus a distinctively human activity, a social activity, and it leads to self-development and self-realization. In labour man ‘acts upon external nature and changes it, and in this way he simultaneously changes his own nature’.

In conditions of alienation, however, work is reduced to its ‘animal’ characteristics. It loses its distinctively human features and becomes a mere means to satisfy our individual material needs. These ideas originate directly from Hegel’s philosophy; they are developed and given a critical dimension by Marx.

Economic relations

4) Mainstream economics regards work as an essentially individual activity to satisfy individual needs. Although it may well take place within the context of relations with others,
these are treated as external to the individual and contingent. Marx, following Hegel, criticizes this account. Human beings are essentially social. Work, as a human activity, always and necessarily occurs within a context of social relations. In the *1844 Manuscripts* and subsequently Marx insists that in work we create not only a material product, we also produce and reproduce our social relationships.\(^{26}\)

As the products of our labour we should be able to recognise our social and economic relations as a confirmation of our powers and abilities. In conditions of alienation, however, they become independent of us and opposed to us. Individuals are atomised and economic forces take on a life of their own, obeying their own quasi-objective laws. This is what Marx identifies as the fourth aspect of alienation: the alienation of `man from man’.

This is how both individuals and economic relations are usually regarded in economics. However, individuals are not separate atoms; and economic laws, unlike natural laws, are social products, specific to particular forms of society. Mainstream economics thus presents what are the alienated features of a specific sort of society as though there are objective and universal economic forms. In this way, Marx’s critique of political economy in this area parallels his critique of the economists’ picture of labour.

**Later developments**

Marx does not abandon these ideas in his later economic thought, rather he develops and extends them. In *1844 Manuscripts* Marx’s account of alienated labour is extensive, whereas his account of alienation from economic relations is brief and sketchy. In his later writings he extends and develops both accounts, but particularly the latter.\(^{27}\) This is evident in his accounts of the concepts of abstract labour and the idea of fetishism which are central features of Marx’s theory of value which is presented in its finished form in Chapter One of *Capital*.\(^{28}\) These concepts do not constitute a break but rather a development and extension of ideas initially first sketched out in his early works under heading of ‘estranged labour’.

**Abstract labour**

According to the theory of value which is at the core of Marx’s economic thought, a commodity has two aspects: a use value and a (exchange) value. Two different kinds of labour go into its creation. In so far as work creates a use value (a product that meets needs), it is concrete labour. Different forms of concrete labour go to create qualitatively different products to meet different specific needs (carpentry is different activity from shoemaking,
etc.). But in so far as the product of labour is destined for exchange, the labour that goes into it creates something of value which can be equated with and exchanged for other things of equal value. According to Marx, this equivalence of value is achieved by equating the quantities of labour embodied in them. The labour involved in this value relation is what Marx terms ‘abstract’, ‘homogeneous’, ‘social labour’. Such abstract labour is a mere means to the creation of value, it is indifferent to its specific concrete quality.

The abstraction involved here is not a merely conceptual matter, Marx insists, ‘it is an abstraction which is made every day in the social process of production’. Moreover, it occurs only in conditions in which commodity production has become the prevalent form: i.e., in bourgeois society.

Indifference towards specific labours corresponds to a form of society in which individuals can with ease transfer from one labour to another, and where the specific kind is a matter of chance for them, hence of indifference. Not only the category, labour, but labour in reality has here become the means of creating wealth in general, and has ceased to be organically linked with particular individuals in any specific form.

The split between use value and value goes back to beginnings of exchange. However, it grows and reaches its fully developed form only when commodity production achieves predominance in capitalism. ‘The product of labour is an object of utility in all states of society; but it is only a historically specific epoch of development which presents the labour expended in the production of a useful article as an ‘objective’ property of that article, i.e., as its value.’

The social effects of the development commodity production were becoming apparent in ancient Athens, a city state whose wealth was founded largely on commerce and trade. In Plato’s and Aristotle’s time the distinction between use value and value, concrete and abstract labour, was beginning to manifest itself socially; but concrete labour, production for use, was still the predominant sort of production.

Plato treats craft work (e.g., shoe making), and money making as two quite separate and distinct activities, and maintains that the ‘proper’ activity of the worker is to pursue his craft and not to make money. Aristotle formulates the distinction between use value and value with great clarity, and regards the use value of a product as its ‘proper’ use.
Every piece of property has a double use … For example a shoe may be used either to put on your foot or to offer in exchange. Both are uses of the shoe; for even he that gives a shoe to someone who requires a shoe, and receives in exchanges coins or food, is making used of the shoe as a shoe, but not the use proper to it, for a shoe is not expressly made for purposes of exchange.³⁵

Now, with the development of capitalism, commodity production has become the predominant form. Most production is not directly for use but for exchange. Exchange value predominates over use value; abstract labour predominates over concrete labour: i.e. labour which is a mere means to an end external to it predominates. We do not usually satisfy our needs directly through our work. Rather, work takes the form of wage labour: it is undertaken in order to earn a wage, and its product is robbed of all specificity, it is simply something of value, destined for exchange.

This is precisely the form of work that Marx analyses under the heading of `alienated’ or `estranged’ labour in the 1844 Manuscripts. In his later work he gives an account of it under the heading of `abstract labour’. This concept is first fully developed in A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859) and subsequently in Capital, specifically in the context of the theory of value (as outlined briefly above). This notion is just beginning to emerge in Grundrisse (1858): for example in the following passage where the connection between the earlier notion of alienated labour and the later concept is clearly evident.

The worker himself is absolutely indifferent to the specificity of his labour; it has no interest for him as such, but only in as much as it is in fact labour and, as such, a use value for capital. It is therefore his economic character that he is the carrier of labour as such—i.e. of labour as use value for capital; he is a worker, in opposition to the capitalist. This is not the character of the craftsmen and guild-members etc., whose economic character lies precisely in the specificity of their labour and in their relation to a specific master, etc. This economic relation—the character which capitalist and worker have as the extremes of a single relation of production—therefore develops more purely and adequately in proportion as labour loses all the characteristics of art; as its particular skill becomes something more and more abstract and irrelevant, and as it becomes more and more a purely abstract activity, a purely mechanical activity, hence indifferent to its particular form.³⁶
Economic and social relations

Economic and social relations, too, take on an alienated form: a form which is independent and hostile. Marx uses a graphic image to describe this sort of alienation: `Modern bourgeois society … a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells.'

In *Grundrisse*, again, the connection of alienated forms of economic relation and alienated forms of labour is clearly spelled out.

> Activity, regardless of its individual manifestation, and the product of activity, regardless of its particular make-up, are always *exchange value*, and exchange value is a generality in which all individuality and peculiarity are negated and extinguished … The social character of activity, as well as the social form of the product, and the share of individuals in production here appear as something alien and objective, confronting the individuals, not as their relation to one another, but as their subordination to relations which subsist independently of them and which arise out of collisions between mutually indifferent individuals.

In *Capital*, Marx analyses alienated economic and social relations of this sort under the heading of the ´fetishism of commodities’. Exchange value achieves a quasi-objective existence, it appears to be a property of the object. Economic relations take on a seemingly objective and independent form as economic laws. In this way social relations take on the ´fetishized’ form of relations between things.

Mainstream economics regards economic laws as objective and timeless, like laws of nature. According to Marx, however, they are created by the specific social and historical conditions of bourgeois society. With altered social conditions they can therefore be changed.

To maintain that these notions are historically specific is not to suggest that they are mere subjective social appearances or purely conceptual phenomena. On the contrary, economic relations are objective social and historical phenomenon. ´The categories of bourgeois economics consist precisely of forms … of thought which are socially valid, and therefore objective, for the relations of production belonging to this historically determined mode of social production.’
Thus, these categories are not universal. The economic relations that they describe came into being with the rise to predominance of commodity production; and they will cease to operate in the future when bourgeois relations of production cease to be the predominant form of economic life.

**Alienation and the critique of capitalism**

These ideas are at the basis of Marx’s criticisms of capitalism. Although there is undoubtedly a moral dimension to Marx’s critique of capitalism, this is not the main character of his critique even in his early work. And, in particular, this is not the main significance of the concept of alienation. Its main purpose rather is to analyse the nature of capitalist economic forms. Their impact is not entirely negative, as the moral interpretation tends to imply, it is more complex and contradictory. Marx understands the effects of capitalism in historical and dialectical terms and this leads towards a historical rather than a merely moral form of criticism.

Precapitalist forms of labour, such as craft work, are limited in content and scope. Such work is restricted to specific materials and techniques and small in scale. Economic life before the growth of capitalist relations of production took place within the context of the household and of personal and local relationships. The development of capitalism means that people are detached from these connections and subjected to new economic relations that come with abstract and alien forms of work and social life. However, the impact of these developments is not entirely negative. For in the process people are progressively freed from the confines of natural and immediate bonds. They are subjected to economic relations through which their activities and connections become wider and more universal; and through these they acquire new capabilities and develop in individuality, self-consciousness and freedom.

These dialectical and Hegelian themes are central to Marx’s account of alienation and his critique of bourgeois society. However, they are ignored or even positively denied in much of the recent discussion of Marx’s thought. For example, these Hegelian aspects of Marx’s thought are rejected entirely by Althusser; and they are usually overlooked by analytical Marxists as well. Exceptionally, however, G. A. Cohen gives an excellent account of them in places. With the traditional, precapitalist artisan, he writes,

> His contentment with, and absorption in, his own narrow trade compose what Marx deemed a "slavish relationship." He identifies with his work and his role, but his mind
is subjected to his occupation, whereas the modern proletarian does not care about the job he performs, or what kind of job it is. The wageworker's indifference manifests his alienation. But it also betokens a birth of freedom. The artisan using his own means of production, typically handed down by his father, is caught like a "snail inside its shell"; but the fact that the nineteenth-century worker is propertyless, which explains his misery, signifies an independence, a detachment from this particular machine and this particular job, a disengagement the guildsman does not know.  

This is not to say that alienation is a satisfactory condition, or one to be welcomed. It involves distress and suffering. However, these negative aspects themselves give rise to the forces to overcome them. Seen in this light, capitalism and its economic forms – alienation and abstract labour – are not purely negative phenomena. They play also a positive role in the process of human development. Marx’s judgement on them is not one of mere moral condemnation, it is relative and historical. Relative to earlier forms of social relation, alienation is a positive phenomenon in the way I have indicated; but as conditions for its overcoming are created it becomes something negative and a hindrance to development.

Overcoming alienation means regaining control of our productive activity and economic life. This cannot be achieved by a return to immediate production for use without the mediation of exchange relations. That is what sometimes appears to be implied by thinkers strongly influenced by Aristotle, or by various forms of Green romanticism. Such regression is now out of the question and, in any case, it would be undesirable: it ignores the progress – both material and moral – that economic development has brought about. Rather what Marxism envisages is that the economic development will eventually create the conditions through which alienation can be overcome by the social appropriation of control over the economy by the ‘associated producers’. Then, economic life will no longer take an alienated and hostile form.

This does not require the complete elimination of the role of exchange, or consideration of value, or of abstract labour, which would be possible only with a return to the simplest and most primitive form of economic and social life. Rather what is envisaged is the social organization and control of production and exchange. This entails overcoming the subordination of use value to exchange value, of the domination of commodity production in economic life, and the re-appropriation of control over our social relations and economic life, and, with that, the end of fetishism.
The concept of alienation and its expression in the ideas of fetishism and abstract labour, embodies these wider – social, moral, political, economic – themes in Marx’s thought.
Notes


13 However, they are by no means entirely absent as McLellan rightly says (23, quoted below).


15 For example, Fromm, *Marx's Concept of Man*; Tucker, *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx*.

16 Cf Marcello Musto, "Revisiting Marx's Concept of Alienation," *Socialism and Democracy* 24, no. 3 (2010).

17 ‘Alienation’ is one of the standard translations of both Entfremdung and Entäuβerung in Marx’s work. I am not aware of any clear evidence that Marx uses these terms to denote different concepts (ibid., 87 n.7). Like most other authors in English I will not distinguish between these terms.


21 Marx, "Estranged Labour".


26 Through estranged labour man not only produces his relationship to the object and to the act of production as to alien and hostile powers; he also produces the relationship in which other men stand to his production and product, and the relationship in which he stands to these other men. (Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844", 331).


31 Marx, *Grundrisse*, 104.


There is some apparent ambiguity in Marx about whether alienation is specific to capitalism, for at times he appears to imply that alienation is a feature of all class divided societies. However, the main account given in the *1844 Manuscripts*, and the later notions of fetishism and abstract labour, clearly imply that these kinds of alienated labour are specific to capitalism. For a fuller discussion see Sayers, *Marx and Alienation: Essays on Hegelian Themes*, 87ff.


Cohen, "The Dialectic of Labour in Marx", 189.